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Abstract: This essay first refutes two extant views on the relationship between 
Confucian ethics and care ethics, that is, 1) Confucian ethics is a care ethics, and 
2) Confucian ethics and care ethics are virtue ethics. It then proposes that a better 
accommodation of Confucian ethics and care ethics into a single value system is to 
put them under relation ethics. While Confucian ethics is relation-oriented, care 
ethics is relation-constituted. 
 
Regarding the relationship between Confucian ethics and care ethics, there are two 
kinds of mainstream opinions. One is represented by Chenyang Li (1994; 2008) and 
characterizes Confucian ethics, Mencius ethics included, as a care ethics. The other is 
hold by scholars such as Daniel Star (2002) and Raja Halwani (2003) and regards 
Confucian ethics and care ethics as virtue ethics. This essay in the following will 
reject both views and propose a new approach that can accommodate Confucian 
ethics and care ethics in a single value system. 
To avoid confusion and ambiguity, two points should be clarified beforehand. 
First, by Confucian ethics, this essay does not refer to the broad and prolonged ethical 
tradition of Confucianism, which is far beyond its coverage. Rather, it succeeds 
previous discussions pertinent to the topic and focuses on Confucius ethics as well as 
Mencius ethics in elaborating Confucian ethical points. Second, when talking about 
care ethics, instead of referring it broadly as a cluster of normative ethical theories, 
this essay, following Li’s arguments, draws support from Carol Gilligan and Nel 
Noddings’s works. 
 
Rejection I: Mencius Ethics Is Care Ethics 
 
This essay will begin with Li’s enlightening article of Does Confucian Ethics 
Integrate Care Ethics and Justice Ethics? The Case of Mencius (2008). While some 
scholars hold that Confucian ethics embraces both care and justice, Li’s article, by 
introducing the concept of “configuration of values,” claims that care ethics and 
justice ethics cannot be integrated into Confucian ethics. He first distinguishes two 
kinds of perspectives: perspectives as an aspect of view or single-aspect perspective 
and perspectives as interrelated aspects or configured perspective, and argues that 
different ethics may embrace the same values from a single-aspect perspective, but 
they have different ways of configuration of these values. Li contends that while care 
and justice may be compatible as single-aspect perspectives within a configured 
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perspective since a configured perspective can embrace both values, care ethics and 
justice ethics are incompatible as configured perspectives because these two 
configurations contradict each other and cannot be incorporated into a single value 
system. Further, Li holds that although Mencius advocates both care and justice as 
single-aspect perspectives, he does not embrace care ethics and justice ethics as 
configured perspectives. Besides, in contrast to justice ethics, Confucian ethics 
attaches great importance to family relationships and, in maintaining such 
relationships, Confucian ethics is willing to give up impartiality. Therefore, Li 
concludes that Mencius ethics should be considered as a care ethics rather than a 
justice ethics or a mixture of these two ethics. 
Li’s approach is novel and inspiring and his arguments are systematic, however, 
there is an inconsistency of standard in his illustration of the relationships among care 
ethics, justice ethics, and Confucian ethics. It is said that care and justice are 
compatible as single-aspect perspectives, while care ethics and justice ethics are 
incompatible as configured perspectives, because these two ethics “give opposite 
answers to the question of which single-aspect perspective is more important” (Li 
2008, 74-75). When it comes to the relationship between care ethics and Confucian 
ethics, however, Li suggests that Confucian ethics, or more precisely Mencius ethics, 
is a kind of care ethics. It is thus only reasonable to say that in Li’s view both care 
ethics and Mencius ethics give the same answer to the question of which single-aspect 
perspective is more important, and they place the same value above the other in their 
configuration of ethical values. If the above analysis is correct, this essay holds 
differently from Li on this point. 
Li’s argument is based on the notion that ren (benevolence 仁) is the core 
concept in Confucianism. Undoubtedly, Confucian ethics takes ren to be an 
uppermost virtue. But we cannot say that ren is the uppermost value in Confucian 
ethics. In Xunzi, for example, li (ritual propriety 礼) is evidently more prominent than 
ren. In the following, this essay will argue that ren is not the uppermost value in 
Mencius either. Rather, it is only one of the four supreme virtues, namely, ren, yi 
(righteousness 义), li, and zhi (wisdom 智). It says that, 
 
The feeling of compassion is the sprout of benevolence. The feeling of distain is the 
sprout of righteousness. The feeling of deference is the sprout of ritual propriety. 
The feeling of approval and disapproval is the sprout of wisdom. People having 
these four sprouts is like their having four limbs. (Mencius 2A: 6)1 
 
The four sprouts of the four virtues, that is, ren, yi, li, and zhi, parallel with each other. 
No particular stress is laid on any one of them. Besides, these four sprouts, as well as 
the four virtues, are intrinsic to every man. In Mencius 6A: 6, it says that, 
 
 
1 Quotations of Mencius are based on Mengzi: with selections from traditional commentaries, 
translated, with Introduction and Notes, by Bryan W. Van Norden (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 2008). 
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Humans all have the feeling of compassion. Humans all have the feeling of disdain. 
Humans all have the feeling of respect. Humans all have the feeling of approval 
and disapproval. The feeling of compassion is benevolence. The feeling of disdain 
is righteousness. The feeling of respect is propriety. The feeling of approval and 
disapproval is wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not 
welded to us externally. We inherently have them. 
 
More importantly, not a single one of them can be omitted or downplayed. The 
absence of any one of them will make a man not a man anymore. This could be 
backed up by the statement in Mencius 2A: 6 that, “if one is without the feeling of 
compassion, one is not human. If one is without the feeling of disdain, one is not 
human. If one is without the feeling of respect, one is not human. If one is without the 
feeling of approval and disapproval, one is not human.” The equal importance of the 
four feelings is thus obvious. 
Emerged from the four paralleled sprouts, the four virtues are not only equally 
important as single-aspect perspectives, but also as configured perspectives. That is to 
say, people should make their decision or behave based on a much comprehensive 
consideration of these four virtues in accordance with the concrete relationships and 
specific situations rather than acting merely out of ren. For example, in dealing with a 
lawsuit, ren is not the magistral virtue in Mencius. A judge should not be dominated 
by his feeling of compassion toward a wrongdoer. On the contrary, he should make a 
clear distinction between right and wrong, and deal with the wrongdoer in accordance 
with the principle of justice and law. It is clearly expressed in the Wuxing (The Five 
Conducts 五行), unearthed manuscript from Guodian Chu Tomb, that, 
 
If one lacks straightforward determination, he will not take action. If one does not 
harbor lenience, he is not discerning of the way. To mete out great punishments for 
great crimes is to have “straightforward determination”; to pardon minor crimes is 
to “harbor lenience.” If one does not mete out great punishments for great crimes, 
he will not be taking action; if he does not pardon minor crimes, he will not be 
discerning of the way. (Cook 2012, 514)2 
 
In addition, it also says that straightforward determination is the orientation of yi, and 
harboring lenience is the orientation of ren (Cook 2012, 514). Apparently, ren is not 
the single ultimate value in judging a crime. If it is a severe crime, the judge ought not 
to commiserate or harbor the wrongdoer, as the orientation of yi is being called upon 
in the case. Heavy punishment should be carried out. Nevertheless, it does not imply 
that the judge should cast off ren. It is still possible that when a judge severely 
punishes the criminal following the orientation of yi, he is at the same time showing 
his compassion towards the victim and other people, even things, involved. But he 
should uphold yi as his main principle and not be influenced by personal emotion of 
compassion and thus partial in sentencing. The case would be totally different if the 
crime is a minor one. The predominant value becomes ren and accordingly the 
 
2 Quotations of the Wu Xing text in this essay are based on The Bamboo Texts of Guodian: a 
study & complete translation, vols. , translated by Scott Cook (Cornell East Asia Series, 2012 ). 
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orientation of ren should be applied. As a result, minor crime should be pardoned to 
harbor lenience. Mencius followed and developed this idea of the Wuxing. He does 
not presuppose a single utmost value. The four virtues, namely, ren, yi, li, and zhi are 
of equal importance and dominate in turn according to specific situations. 
This equal importance of the four virtues constitutes one of the reasons why 
Mencius always promotes the virtue of ren and the virtue of yi simultaneously. 
According to Pang Pu’s reading, the virtue of yi, rooted in the feeling of disdain, runs 
also as a kind of moral restriction to the virtue of ren. The feeling of disdain includes 
two components, that is, the feeling of shame (xiu 羞) and the feeling of dislike (wu
惡). The former makes people feel shameful when they are not morally good, and the 
latter is the detestation towards others when others are not morally good (Pang 2005, 
452). With such a limitation, people should apply their feeling of disdain only to good 
people and on good deeds in an appropriate manner without abusing it. Another 
account for promoting ren and yi simultaneously is that people need to adjust their 
emphasis on different virtues from time to time based on the roles they are playing in 
society. It says in Mencius 7B: 24 that, “Benevolence between father and son, 
righteousness between ruler and minister, propriety between guest and host, and 
wisdom in relation to the worthy.”3 This shows the emphasis that Mencius places on 
specific virtues with respect to people’s specific roles within different relationships. 
For example, in the relationship between a father and his son, the emphasis should be 
put on the virtue of ren. Let ren be the guiding virtue in the father-son relationship. 
When this father is facing the ruler, however, his role shifts from a “father” to a 
“minister.” The virtue of yi accordingly stands out in the ruler-minister relationship. 
The same logic also applies to li and zhi. 
The situation is different in care ethics. From a configured perspective, 
care/caring plays the most important role. According to care ethics, the caring 
person4, instead of appealing to reason, the universal principles, or other fixed rules, 
tends to make moral decisions or act based on feelings and a sense of “personal 
ideal.” She tries to apprehend the real situations of the other and figure out what the 
other expects of her. Thus, caring behavior is actually related to the other’s wants and 
 
3 According to Van Norden’s translation, it follows that “the sage in relation to the Way of 
Heaven 聖人之於天道也.” This essay, however, takes the character of ren 人 as a redundant 
word. Hence the sentence should be “sagacity in relation to the Way of Heaven 聖之於天道也. 
Most of the time, Mencius does not parallel sagacity (sheng 聖) with ren, yi, li, and zhi. This is 
because sheng belongs to the tian’s Way, while the other four belong to human Way. It says in 
the Wuxing text that, “When all five kinds of virtuous action are in harmony, it is called ‘virtue’. 
When four kinds of action are in harmony, it is called ‘good’. Good is the human Way. Virtue 
is tian’s Way”. “Five” refers to ren, yi, li, zhi and sheng, and “four” refers to ren, yi, li, and zhi. 
Mencius’ focus is on the human Way, that is, ren, yi, li, and zhi. 
4 In discussing care ethics, this essay uses co’nsistently female pronouns and examples to refer 
to the one-caring. But neither does it mean all women would practice care ethics, nor will it 
exclude all men outside our consideration. It is not a rivalry between women and men. What 
this essay aims to illustrate here are two different approaches. And the use of female pronouns 
and examples only serve to avoid confusion. 
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desires, and also the objective problematic situations the other is facing. In addition, 
the caring relationship needs the one-caring to get rid of frame of self-reference and 
get into that of the cared-for. The mental engrossment focuses on the other, the cared-
for, rather than the one-caring. 
A comparison on sentencing is given by Nel Noddings in the Caring (2003). She 
comes up with two approaches in asserting the proper punishment of a particular 
crime. The father, who represents the traditional approach, concerns about the 
principles that the wrongdoer violates; while the mother, acting out of affection and 
regard, may want to inquiry more about the criminal and his victims. The former 
points directly to the abstraction, therefore he can deal with the case distinctly and 
logically despite the intricate interferences such as the particular person and specific 
circumstances. The immediate response of the latter, on the contrary, directs to 
concretization, involving herself in concrete facts, feelings and requirements of others, 
and personal relationships and histories. On account of these two different approaches, 
the father may uphold the principles and adhere to the rules at the expense of 
scarifying his criminal son. The mother, however, tends to protect her son regardless 
of all the principles and rules (Noddings, 2003, 36-37). 
Another compelling example mentioned by Carol Gilligan’s In A Different Voice 
(1982) also presents the caring perspective. The female lawyer Hilary, who considers 
self-sacrificing conducts courageous and praiseworthy, runs into dilemmas in both her 
personal life and professional life. She finds it impossible to avoid hurt “in a 
relationship where the truths of each person is conflicting” and “in court where, 
despite her concern for the client on the other side, she decided not to help her 
opponent win his case.” She found, in both instances, “the absolute injunction against 
hurting others to be an inadequate guide to resolving the actual dilemmas she faced.” 
Her final solution to such dilemmas is to claim “the right to include herself among the 
people whom she considers it moral not to hurt” (Gilligan, 1982, 165). 
Therefore, the nearly insane conducts of Bree Van de Kamp in the TV series 
named Desperate Housewives seem understandable, or at least not that “insane.” She 
exerts all her energies to cover the crime of her son who runs over one of her best 
friends’ mother-in-law. She also does whatever she can to conceal her unmarried 
daughter’s disgraceful pregnancy, even pretends to be pregnant herself and tries to 
raise the child as her own son. All these madnesses are at least partly out of a 
mother’s caring toward her children. It is said by Noddings that “If I care enough, I 
may do something wild and desperate in behalf of the other … Hence, in caring, my 
rational powers are not diminished, but they are enrolled in the service of my 
engrossment in the other” (Noddings, 2003, 36). 
From the above analysis and the distinct responses in dealing judicial issues, we 
can see that ren or caring is not the sole and most important consideration in Mencius. 
Compared with the caring in care ethics, Mencius’ ren carries much more restrictions. 
People have to take other important virtues into account and think much more 
comprehensively. Besides, personal feelings and emotions are not always wanted in 
Mencius. In certain situations, subjective sentiments, like empathy and compassion, 
should be put aside. By contrast, private affections and regards are essential to care 
ethics. They are indispensable in any case. Hence, even though the notion of ren in 
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Mencius in some way resembles caring in care ethics as single-aspect perspectives, 
the ethics of Mencius and care ethics are different as configured perspectives. 
 
Rejection II: Confucius Ethics Is Care Ethics 
 
When it refers to Confucius ethics, which considers the virtue of ren to be the utmost 
virtue, there undeniably are some similarities between the concept of ren in Confucius 
and that of caring in care ethics. With respect to the similarities, Chenyang Li mainly 
hammers at three major areas in his article The Confucian Concept of Jen and the 
Feminist Ethics of Care: A Comparative Study (1994). First, he contends that Jen (i.e. 
ren), being the highest moral ideal of Confucianism, can be best interpreted as caring, 
which is the highest moral ideal of care ethics. He says that, “Even if the entire 
concept of Jen (Jen of affection and Jen of virtue) cannot be reduced to ‘caring,’ at 
least we can say that ‘caring’ occupies a central place in this concept” (Li, 1994, 74). 
Second, the highest moral ideals as they are, neither Jen nor caring pursues general 
principles or universal rules. More importantly, they both “remain flexible with 
rules.” Third, both Confucian ethics and care ethics promote their highest moral ideals, 
namely Jen and caring, with gradations. It is said that “although we should care for 
everyone in the world if possible, we do need to start with those closest to us,” and 
this is “the only reasonable way to practice Jen and care” (Li, 1994, 81). Based on 
these similarities, Li comes to his conclusion that Confucian ethics is a care ethics. 
Hot debates follow consequently. In the article Do Confucians Really care? A 
Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li (2002), Daniel 
Star, on the one hand, critiques this Confucian care thesis, namely, the thesis that 
Confucian ethics is either philosophically very similar to care ethics or is actually a 
form of care ethics. He contends that Confucian ethics is better conceived of as a 
unique kind of role-focused virtue ethics. On the other hand, he also argues that care 
ethics is by no means merely a new approach to virtue ethics. Ranjoo Seodu Herr 
(2003) also rejects the proposition that Confucian ethics is a kind of care ethics by 
examining two aspects of Confucianism and care ethics that allegedly converge: their 
emphasis on human relationship and their prescriptions for maintaining harmonious 
human relationship, namely, the cultivation of ren in Confucianism and caring in care 
ethics. She analyzes that their respective prescriptions regarding human relationship 
are unbridgeable. And the effort to assimilate these two ethics rests on the 
downplaying and neglect of li, and on the misunderstanding of the feminist 
conception of care. Raja Halwani (2003), in the article Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics, 
argues that care ethics should be subsumed under virtue ethics by construing care as 
an important virtue, which allows us to achieve two desirable goals. First, we preserve 
what is important about care ethics, such as its insistence on particularity, partiality, 
emotional engagement, and the importance of care to our moral lives. Second, we 
avoid two important objections to care ethics, namely, that it neglects justice, and that 
it contains no mechanism by which care can be regulated so as not to go to morally 
corruption. 
The above authors propose different kinds of tenable arguments to oppose the 
notion of considering Confucian ethics a care ethics. This essay is in sympathy with 
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them on this point. However, it is not satisfied with their notion of taking Confucian 
ethics and care ethics as virtue ethics. The essay will further argue against Li’s notion 
in what follows by rejecting his three similarities, and in the meantime draw forth its 
own view on the relationship between Confucian ethics and care ethics. 
The first similarity to be rejected is that neither Confucian concept of ren nor 
caring of care ethics involves general principles. Care ethics does not call on 
abstractions but devotes to concretizations. It “recognizes and calls forth human 
judgment across a wide range of fact and feeling” (Li, 1994, 77). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to attribute it as non-general-principle-needed. However, it is at least 
debatable to say that Confucian concept of ren “cannot be achieved by following 
general principles” (Li 1994, 76). As a matter of fact, this essay holds that Confucian 
ethics involves general principles, and the Confucian concept of li and its 
requirements actually serve as the kind of general principles regulating the virtue of 
ren. 
First, li in Confucianism gives a series of general principles, acting up to which 
can lead to the accomplishment of ren. A conversation is recorded in the Analects 
12.1: 
 
Yan Hui asked about ren. The Master said, “Restricting yourself and return to rites 
constitutes ren. If for one day you managed to restrain yourself and return to the 
rites, in this way you could lead the entire world back to ren. The key to achieving 
ren lies within yourself — how could it come from other?” 
Yan Hui asked, “May I inquire as to the specifics?” The Master said, “Do not look 
unless it is in accordance with ritual; do not listen unless it is in accordance with 
ritual; do not speak unless it is in accordance with ritual; do not move unless it is in 
accordance with ritual.” Yan Hui replied, “Although I am not quick to understand, I 
ask permission to devote myself to this teaching.” 5 
 
This passage conveys at least three messages. 1) One can attain the virtue of ren and 
become a person of ren by restricting himself and returning to li. In this sense, ren can 
be perceived as the internalization of li. The achievement of ren does not depend on 
others but is determined by one’s own efforts. Therefore, it is inappropriate to say that 
ren cannot be accomplished by following li which contains a series of moral 
principles. 2) These indispensable “specifics” are the general requirements of li. They 
are always applicable and can be used to regulate people’s behaviors in any situation 
at any time, which means they are general and universal. 3) Virtuous as Yan Hui was, 
he still modestly made practicing the four “specifics” his business. This concrete 
example shows indirectly the feasibility and efficiency of achieving ren by following 
the four specifics. 
Second, although li is not the utmost virtue in Confucianism as configured 
perspective, it is indispensable as single-aspect perspective to the virtue of ren. In the 
Analects, it is mentioned in many places the essential functions that li plays. For 
 
5 Quotations of Analects are based on Confucius Analects, translated by Edward Slingerland 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2003), with modifications when necessary. 
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example, it appears repeatedly that, “Someone who is broadly learned with regard to 
culture, and whose conduct is restrained by the li, can be counted upon to not go 
astray” (Analects 6.27; 12.15). Yan Yuan also says that “The Mater is skilled at 
gradually leading me on, step by step. He broadens me with culture and restrains me 
with rites” (Analects 9.11). From these we can see, in order to prevent one from going 
against the utmost virtue of ren, it is imperative to restrain oneself by li and act in 
coherence with its requirements. According to Confucius, if people do not behave in 
accordance with li, they do not really achieve the full excellence (Analects 15.33). 
Therefore, it is safe to say that he who wants to be a person of ren should conduct 
according to the requirements of li. Otherwise, if a person does not learn and 
understand li, he could not even take his place in the society (Analects 20.3, 16.13, 
and 8.8). In addition to ren, the restrictive function of li also works well when it is 
applied to other important Confucian virtues, which are concrete presentations and 
different aspects of the utmost virtue ren in specific situations. To name some, the 
virtue of gong (respectfulness 恭), shen (carefulness 慎), yong (courageousness 勇), 
and zhi (upright 直), etc. These virtues are highly praised and greatly promoted as 
single-aspect perspectives in Confucianism. Nonetheless, they will go astray without 
the regulating of li: respectfulness becomes exasperation, carefulness becomes 
timidity, courageousness becomes unruliness, and upright becomes inflexibility 
(Analects 8.2). 
Third, most of the requirements of li are flexible and open to modifications in 
their application, though, there are certain unchangeable universal rules of it. We can 
examine the example proposed in Li’s article. In Analects 4.18, the Master says that, 
“In serving his father and mother a man may gently remonstrate with them. But if he 
sees that he has failed to change their opinion, he should resume an attitude of 
deference and not thwart them.”6  Different from Li, this essay reads from it the 
absolute obedience and respect for a son towards his parents. A son should always 
serve his parents with reverence and respect. Even in cases when his parents are 
wrong, a son should not point out their mistakes straightly or impolitely. He should 
give his advice in an appropriate way and at an appropriate degree. If his parents do 
not take the advice, he should not complain or be dissatisfied with them, but attend 
upon them with an even higher degree of reverence and respect. Besides, he should 
not give up easily but continue to hold on to his responsibility until he convinces his 
parents successfully and assists them to become better persons (Herr, 2003, 472-473). 
This is not blind filial piety, but a great wisdom in dealing with the intricate inter-
personal relationships in Confucianism. The son preserves yi without violating li, not 
to mention that he turns his parents into better persons as well. 
In denying that filial piety to one’s parents is absolute, Li also resorts to the 
collision between filial piety to one’s parents and loyalty (zhong 忠) to the ruler, and 
asserts that “Confucianism offers no general rules to solve the problem” (Li 1994, 78) 
when they conflict with each other. Tension, or even conflict, does exist between filial 
piety and loyalty sometimes, but the two can be accommodated. Mencius holds that 
 
6 This translation is adopted from Li’s article. 
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the greatest service is severing one’s parents (Mencius 4A: 19), therefore loyalty is 
logically secondary to filial piety. When addressing the seemingly dilemma of Shun 
being so laboriously engaged in the sovereign’s business that he was unable to 
nourish his parents, Mencius says that of all which a filial son can attain to, there is 
nothing greater than his honoring to his parents; while of what can be attained to in 
honoring his parents, there is nothing greater than nourishing them with the whole 
kingdom (Mencius 5A: 4). In other words, being loyal to the sovereign by serving the 
state is actually the greatest filial piety towards one’s parents. A sound account would 
be that by serving the state, one helps to maintain the state in peace and prosperous, 
which will in turn benefit one’s family and let the family prosperous in a peaceful 
environment. As is expressed in the Springs and Autumns of the Lu’s Family (Lüshi 
Chunqiu 吕氏春秋), if the whole state is in chaos, there is no stable family within it. 
It would be impossible for people to live and work in peace and contentment and to 
be happy and prosperous if the whole state is devastated and ravished. 
In fact, filial piety and loyalty not only can be accommodated, but they are 
essentially in agreement to Confucians. According to the chapter of “A Summary 
Account of Sacrifices” (Ji Tong 祭统) in the Book of Rites (Liji 礼记), “There is a 
fundamental agreement between a loyal subject in his service of his ruler and a filial 
son in his service of his parents” (25.2). In the chapter of “The Meaning of Sacrifices” 
(Ji Yi 祭义), it also says that, “if (a man) in serving his ruler, he be not loyal, he is not 
filial” (24.26). Confucius is also quoted in the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiao Jing 孝经) 
as saying that filial piety is the root of all virtues. Filial piety is divided into different 
stages: “it commences with the service of parents; it proceeds to the service of the 
ruler; it is completed by the establishment of character” (1.1). Hence, the seemingly 
contradiction between filial piety and loyalty cannot be used to deprive the 
absoluteness from filial piety. 
 
Rejection III: Care Ethics Is Merely a Virtue Ethics 
 
When comes to Li’s third similarity, this essay agrees that gradation appears in both 
Confucian ethics and care ethics. Nonetheless, this essay argues that the gradation of 
ren is essentially different from that of caring. It believes that the extension of 
Confucian utmost virtue of ren is self-oriented, while the application of caring in care 
ethics is other-concerned and caring-centered. 
The Confucian belief in “love with gradations” (i.e. ai you cha deng 愛有差等) 
means that instead of loving or caring for all people universally without distinction, 
one should first start from loving or caring one’s own family members and then 
gradually extend it to others. It is also reasonable for Confucians to love or care his 
family more than strangers. Mencius says in 1A: 7 that, “Treat your elders as elders, 
and extend it to the elders of others; treat your young ones as young ones; and extend 
it to the young ones of others.” We should love our own elders and young ones first 
and then extend it to the elders and young ones of others, not the other way around. 
What should be noticed is that Confucian love is self-oriented. It is from my 
family that the love, or caring, is being extended. I begin with my family, love my 
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own elders and young ones, and then extend the love and caring to others. It is both 
mentioned in the Analects 12.2 and 15.24 that, “Do not impose others what you 
yourself do not desire.” This principle is considered as the Confucian Golden Rule. 
And it says in 6.30: “Desiring to take his stand, one who is benevolent helps other to 
take their stand; wanting to realize himself, he helps others to realize themselves. 
Being able to take what is near at hand as an analogy could perhaps be called the 
method of benevolence.” In these two statements, caring also starts from the self. It is 
centered on one’s own desires and feelings, and likes and dislikes, and further 
supposes that others are the same as the caring-self, and have the same needs as the 
caring-self. Accordingly, the caring-self should give others what himself wants, and 
should not impose on others what himself does not want. The problem of this notion 
is that it neglects the real needs and requirements of the others involved. Is what I 
want necessarily the same as the others do, and is what I do not want necessarily 
useless to others? There is no response in Confucian ethics, but it is not hard to 
imagine a negative case in real life. For example, there are plenty parents who want 
their children to live out their own unfulfilled dreams which denies the opportunity of 
their children to live life for themselves. While the husband hates all kinds of flowers, 
his wife may be expecting a bunch of roses on their anniversary. In such cases, people 
should give up being self-oriented. 
Care ethics, on the other hand, is other-concerned and caring-centered. Even 
though the feelings of the one-caring are important, they are not the key consideration. 
Noddings says that, “Caring involves, for the one-caring, a ‘feeling with’ the other. 
We might want to call this relationship ‘empathy,’ but we should think about what we 
mean by this term.” It is not that “the power of projecting one’s personality into, and 
so fully understanding, the object of contemplation” as defined in The Oxford 
Universal Dictionary. She elaborates that the idea of “feeling with” involves, instead 
of projection, reception which she calls “engrossment.” It is neither about the 
extension of my feelings and needs, nor about what I would feel in certain situations 
as Confucian ethics holds. Rather 
 
I receive others into myself, and I see and feel with the other. I become a duality. I 
am not thus caused to see or to feel—that is, to exhibit certain behavioral signs 
interpreted as seeing and feeling—for I am committed to the receptivity that 
permits me to see and to feel in this way. The seeing and feeling are mine, but only 
partly and temporarily mine, as on loan to me. (Noddings, 2003, 30) 
 
In this way, as long as the one-caring receives the cared-for, she is totally with him. 
What we really care is not the problematic situations, but the person. When one cares, 
she stands in the view of the cared-for, his objective needs, and his actual 
expectations from her. The one-caring’s attention and mental engrossment are on the 
cared-for, not on her own feelings. Thus, the reasons for the caring conducts are 
related both with the cared-for’s wants and desires and with the objective factors of 
his problematic situation, not the one-caring’s own personal frame of reference into 
the cared-for (Noddings, 2003, 24). 
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Besides, care ethics concerns relatively less about self-feelings and takes caring 
as responsibility. For example, in Gilligan’s classic study, Claire, one of the female 
participants mentioned, considered Heinz’s dilemma, that is, whether he should steal 
the drug or not, by focusing on the failure of response, rather than on the conflict of 
rights. She not only believes that Heinz should steal the drug since his wife’s life was 
more important than anything, but also thinks that the druggist has a moral obligation 
to show compassion to the patient and he does not have the right to refuse. She also 
says that, “the wife needed him at this point to do it; she couldn’t have done it, and 
it’s up to him to do for her what she needs.” In analyzing this, Gilligan says that, 
“Whether Heinz loves his wife or not is irrelevant to Claire’s decision, not because 
life has priority over affection, but because his wife is another human being who 
needs help. Thus the moral injunction to act stems not from Heinz’s feelings about his 
wife but from his awareness of her need.” In this case, a person’s responsibility 
equates the need to respond that “arises from the recognition that others are counting 
on you and that you are in a position to help.” The one-caring does not resort to any 
principles and rules before conducting. She usually cares naturally and directly, just 
because she wants to responds positively to people who turn to her (Gilligan 1982, 
54). 
Therefore, even though both ren and caring have gradation, they gradate 
differently in an opposite direction. The Confucian notion of ren, being self-centered, 
puts most emphasis on the self and the feelings of the self. The extension of ren starts 
from the self and is based on the closeness of relationships between the self and the 
others. The caring in care ethics, however, is other-oriented. It prioritizes the cared-
for and the feelings of the cared-for. It considers caring as responsibility, and focuses 
on the establishment of the caring relation. 
 
Conclusion: Confucian Ethics and Care Ethics Are Relation Ethics 
 
The above analysis has shown that Confucian ethics, from the perspective of 
Confucius and Mencius, is not care ethics or a care ethics. Then what is the 
relationship between the two ethics? Star proposes to integrate both into a role-
focused virtue ethics (2002). This essay will argue that it is inappropriate to equate 
care ethics a kind of virtue ethics. 
According to Noddings’ definition, there are two meanings of caring, that is, 1) 
caring as a certain kind of relation or encounter; and 2) caring as a virtue, as an 
attribute or disposition frequently exercised by a moral agent (Noddings 2003, xiii). 
Based on the second meaning, we might well consider care ethics as a kind of virtue 
ethics, however, it is not all-inclusive for the first meaning has been overlooked. More 
importantly, Noddings points out that, “Both concepts are useful, but care theory 
itself makes its special contribution through the relational sense” (Noddings 1999, 37). 
Care ethics puts its emphasis on the caring relation. It is believed that relations, rather 
than individuals, are ontologically basic. This means that different from traditional 
moral philosophy, which does not pay enough attention to the contributions of the 
cared-for, care ethics not only requires the one-caring to have the virtue of caring, but 
also depends on the cared-for to successfully receive and accept the caring emitted by 
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the one-caring. It is only after the cared-for receiving and accepting such caring that 
the caring relation can be established. Noddings contends that the primary message of 
caring is that we cannot justify ourselves as carers by claiming “we care.” If the 
recipients of our caring insist that “nobody cares,” caring relations do not exist 
(Noddings 2003, xiv). The caring actions and the caring relations largely depend on 
the cared-fors, not the ones that care. Noddings gives an example. On the one side, 
the students in high school want their teachers to care for them, but they feel nobody 
cares; while on the other side, the teachers convincingly insist that they do care since 
they work hard and hope their students to succeed. In this case, both sides may be 
blameless. But, the teachers obviously care only in the second sense of caring. 
Although they do have the virtue of caring, they fail to establish the caring relations. 
From the perspective of care ethics, caring as a virtue and caring as a relation are both 
important but the later takes a larger share of the importance. In other words, the 
establishment of caring relation is more essential than having the virtue of caring. 
Therefore, from a configured perspective, care ethics should be better described as a 
relation ethics than a virtue ethics. 
According to Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr., the pre-Buddhist 
Confucianism is best described as a role ethics which embodies first “a specific vision 
of human beings as relational persons constituted by the roles they live rather than as 
individual selves,” and embodies as well “a specific vision of the moral life that takes 
family feeling as the entry point for developing a consummate moral competence and 
a religious sensibility grounded in this world” (Ames and Rosemont 2011, 17). This 
means that Confucian ethics lays stress on the realistic life where people are 
interdependent and interactional. Once we were born, we interplay with others and 
live in a web of relations (being self-oriented and starting from family relations). As 
we growing up, the relational web may become more and more expanding and 
intricate. According to Confucianism, we should act in line with our roles within our 
relational web. In this sense, Confucian ethics can also be better characterized as 
relation ethics. For one thing, it is believed that we are relational persons, playing 
different roles in society and aiming to formulate a harmonious web of relations. For 
the other thing, roles are relative and changeable. It only exists when there is/are 
relation(s). For example, in a family, the mother is so called only because the 
existence of her child. Without this mother-child relation, there are no roles of mother 
and son/daughter. No relation, no role(s). Role(s) can only make sense within the 
framework of relation. Hence, relation ethics may well be more appropriate a name 
than role ethics from a configured perspective. 
Each specific role corresponds with certain responsibilities and rights. To 
maintain the relations, everybody within it should perform his responsibilities 
dutifully. As is recorded in the Analects12.11, 
 
Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about governing. Confucius responded, “Let the 
lord be a true lord, the ministers true ministers, the fathers true fathers, and the sons 
true sons.” The Duke replied, “Well put! Certainly if the lord is not a true lord, the 
ministers not true ministers, the fathers not true fathers, and the sons not true sons, 
even if there is sufficient grain, will I ever get to eat it?” 
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Here, “the lord be a true lord, the ministers’ true ministers, the fathers’ true 
fathers, and the sons’ true sons” means that the lord, ministers, fathers and sons all act 
in line with their roles respectively, or more precisely, with the specific 
responsibilities endorsed by their roles. For Confucians, not only the above four roles, 
but actually all roles should act in this way. It is demonstrable from the Confucian 
notion of rectification of names (zhengming 正名), which means that “things in actual 
fact should be made to accord with the implications attached to them by names” 
(Steinkraus, 1980, 262). To be noted, the roles serve to define one’s responsibilities, 
but it is not for the roles themselves, but rather, it is for harmonious relationships and 
ultimately a harmonious society weaved together by all kinds of relationships that 
everyone act upon their responsibilities accordingly. 
The difference between these two relation ethics, namely, care ethics and 
Confucian ethics, is that the former is relation-constituted, while the latter is relation-
oriented. This is because care ethics has already embraced the notion of relation in its 
definition of caring from a configured perspective. The caring-relation constitutes the 
essential element of care ethics. Confucian ethics, however, does not include such 
notion in its definition of ren. But efforts of Confucian ethics are devoted to 
harmonious relations within the society, it thus is relation-oriented. 
To sum up, on the one hand, through the study of Confucius ethics and Mencius 
ethics, it is illustrated that Confucian ethics should not be considered as (a) care ethics. 
Because, ren is not the most important virtue in Mencius and Confucius’ ren is 
different from caring in care ethics from a configured perspective. On the other hand, 
care ethics is not merely about the virtue of caring. Rather, it places more emphasis 
on the relational sense of caring. Therefore, care ethics is not a virtue ethics from a 
configured perspective. This essay holds that Confucian ethics and care ethics can be 
accommodated in relation ethics. The former is relation-oriented, guiding people 
towards harmonious relations; and the latter is relation-constituted, embracing relation 
as its most important element from a configured perspective. 
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